I have anxiously awaited this report, as this incident occurred adjacent to my district on the Coronado NF. The agency helicopter out of Tucson dispatch was diverted from one of our fires in the Peloncillos to the west. I believe the report does daylight several important issues and I appreciate the detail provided. I am struck that the focus during the early stages of IA appears to have been largely about the security situation and may not have adequately addressed the true values at risk compared to the risk exposure of an airborne delivery of the jumpers. The values at risk in this area are very minimal and I have to wonder if the request from the Diamond A may have been given more weight than it was due, given the reported fire behavior and time of day. The Malpai Borderlands Group is a widely respected partner in the area, but we cannot always align our wildland response with their wishes if we believe it is inconsistent with our overall risk analysis. Those discussions have always been frank and respectful on both sides.
I am a private pilot who flys regularly in this area. The turbulent conditions around the Sky Islands in May and June are nothing to mess with and frequently require modifications of our tactics, especially later in the day as heat and winds reach their greatest strength Density altitude, topography and turbulent air are a deadly mixture for all aviation resources in this environment.
With regard to the communications in the boot heel, many agencies have been working to address this issue. The Coronado is in the final stages of permitting for a joint use repeater site being developed by Border Patrol in the southeastern Peloncillos on FS lands that will help cover some of these areas and link to the Coronado’s network of repeaters back to Tucson Dispatch. I am hopeful that this repeater will be online early in the new year, prior to the spring fire season. Thanks for highlighting this report and adding to an important learning opportunity
Fair enough - "some of these concerns" were addressed while the word "why" was utilized eight times in the LR, most were "why" they ordered multiple ambulances and helicopters.
The final "why" was on p. 37: "Learning from the Eicks Incident involves asking (italicized) why (italicized) things were communicated in the way they were or not communicated at all." Exactly. But it is never really answered "why" because of the standard LR pattern - this one was better than most - that follows the standard no blame, no fault, just tell us your story.
Good afternoon DT, no need to apologize for your comments. The 1985 Butte Fire (ID-Salmon NF) and the June 1990 Dude Fire galvanized my total distrust in the alleged "investigation" process.
I have heard of the June 26, 1990, Dude Fire story. In fact, I was there performing as a Field Observer. I can sum it up that with the fact that the AZ Correctional Officer Crew Leader took the only radio and went to the store, leaving AZ DoC Sandra Bachman in charge without realizing he was even gone. Two of us spoke with him along the Control Rd. near Fuller Creek where he was blocked while the fire was blowing across the road. "I should have never left my Crew" several times with cigarettes and soda cans noticeable on the seat next to him.
The comments from the Crew Rep at the eventual fatality site are quite revealing, based on a 1999 Staff Ride (the first USFS Staff Ride) as part of an Fire Behavior Workshop in Phoenix.
Lots to share on our YHFR website with 4-5 posts on it there. Here's some links to get you started
To be sure, this man's death was tragic and unfortunate. However, this was also a predictable and preventable accident resulting in a fatality.
Having worked on fires in that area, this is another bogus Learning Review that never seriously questions WHY they jumped an already staffed fire with local resources already on the fire, road access, very rocky terrain. and known dangerous winds.
I have anxiously awaited this report, as this incident occurred adjacent to my district on the Coronado NF. The agency helicopter out of Tucson dispatch was diverted from one of our fires in the Peloncillos to the west. I believe the report does daylight several important issues and I appreciate the detail provided. I am struck that the focus during the early stages of IA appears to have been largely about the security situation and may not have adequately addressed the true values at risk compared to the risk exposure of an airborne delivery of the jumpers. The values at risk in this area are very minimal and I have to wonder if the request from the Diamond A may have been given more weight than it was due, given the reported fire behavior and time of day. The Malpai Borderlands Group is a widely respected partner in the area, but we cannot always align our wildland response with their wishes if we believe it is inconsistent with our overall risk analysis. Those discussions have always been frank and respectful on both sides.
I am a private pilot who flys regularly in this area. The turbulent conditions around the Sky Islands in May and June are nothing to mess with and frequently require modifications of our tactics, especially later in the day as heat and winds reach their greatest strength Density altitude, topography and turbulent air are a deadly mixture for all aviation resources in this environment.
With regard to the communications in the boot heel, many agencies have been working to address this issue. The Coronado is in the final stages of permitting for a joint use repeater site being developed by Border Patrol in the southeastern Peloncillos on FS lands that will help cover some of these areas and link to the Coronado’s network of repeaters back to Tucson Dispatch. I am hopeful that this repeater will be online early in the new year, prior to the spring fire season. Thanks for highlighting this report and adding to an important learning opportunity
Fair enough - "some of these concerns" were addressed while the word "why" was utilized eight times in the LR, most were "why" they ordered multiple ambulances and helicopters.
The final "why" was on p. 37: "Learning from the Eicks Incident involves asking (italicized) why (italicized) things were communicated in the way they were or not communicated at all." Exactly. But it is never really answered "why" because of the standard LR pattern - this one was better than most - that follows the standard no blame, no fault, just tell us your story.
Good afternoon DT, no need to apologize for your comments. The 1985 Butte Fire (ID-Salmon NF) and the June 1990 Dude Fire galvanized my total distrust in the alleged "investigation" process.
I have heard of the June 26, 1990, Dude Fire story. In fact, I was there performing as a Field Observer. I can sum it up that with the fact that the AZ Correctional Officer Crew Leader took the only radio and went to the store, leaving AZ DoC Sandra Bachman in charge without realizing he was even gone. Two of us spoke with him along the Control Rd. near Fuller Creek where he was blocked while the fire was blowing across the road. "I should have never left my Crew" several times with cigarettes and soda cans noticeable on the seat next to him.
The comments from the Crew Rep at the eventual fatality site are quite revealing, based on a 1999 Staff Ride (the first USFS Staff Ride) as part of an Fire Behavior Workshop in Phoenix.
Lots to share on our YHFR website with 4-5 posts on it there. Here's some links to get you started
(https://www.yarnellhillfirerevelations.com/post/was-the-june-26-1990-dude-fire-a-precursor-for-the-incomplete-lessons-learned-on-june-30-2013) and (https://www.yarnellhillfirerevelations.com/post/2-was-the-june-26-1990-dude-fire-a-precursor-for-the-incomplete-lessons-learned-on-june-30-2013) and (https://www.yarnellhillfirerevelations.com/post/3-was-the-june-26-1990-dude-fire-a-precursor-for-the-incomplete-lessons-learned-on-june-30-201-b) and (https://www.yarnellhillfirerevelations.com/post/3-was-the-june-26-1990-dude-fire-a-precursor-for-the-incomplete-lessons-learned-on-june-30-2013) and (https://www.yarnellhillfirerevelations.com/post/4-was-the-june-26-1990-dude-fire-a-precursor-for-the-incomplete-lessons-learned-on-june-30-2013)
To be sure, this man's death was tragic and unfortunate. However, this was also a predictable and preventable accident resulting in a fatality.
Having worked on fires in that area, this is another bogus Learning Review that never seriously questions WHY they jumped an already staffed fire with local resources already on the fire, road access, very rocky terrain. and known dangerous winds.